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The impetus for writing this paper has been provided by a point John
Noonan makes in the recently published enlarged version of his now
classic 1966 historical study on contraception. I The point pertains to the
basic moral action guide in "H umanae Vitae"; "each and every marriage
act must remain open to the transmission of life."2 That norm has been a
prime source for the consistent magisterial teaching on "H umanae Vitae"
namely, that contraception cannot be a licit means for regulating births.
Noonan, however, argues that the basic action guide cannot be taken
literally and, because of that, encyclical teaching opposed to contraception
need not be taken as exceptionless.
Is a conjugal act at a time which is intrinsically sterile intrinsically open? Not in a
literal sense. Are the conjugal acts of spouses whose sterility has been established,
or the conjugal act of a pregnant spouse, intrinsically open to the transmission of
life? Literally, no. They are closed from transmitting life by physical causes, yet
they are entirely lawful. It is clear then that , concretely, not every act needs to be
open to the transmission of life; and it is inferable that to preserve the sterility of
times which are intrinsically sterile is unobjectionable. To secure such sterility is
not to act against the divine design but to cooperate with it. l

From Noonan's perspective, perhaps, the norm, that "every marriage
act must remain open to the transmission of life", was properly taken as
literal in an earlier period of Church teaching on sexuality - in that
period, for example, when marital coitus was considered as licit only when
procreation was intended and conception thought possible (hence no licit
sexual expression during a time of pregnancy). But, for Noonan, with
"Humanae Vitae" both recognizing and highlighting the intrinsic value in
non-pr~creative expressions of conjugal love (e.g., in the conjugal love of
an elderly couple), the claim that licit conjugal acts must always be open to
procreation is simply not a literal claim.4
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From that perspective, the development of Church teaching in
"H umanae Vitae", in clearly recognizing the unitive value of conjugal love,
cannot be understood as simply adding something new onto something old.
The development, rather, involves a modification of the old. Specifically
for Noonan , the modification is that contraceptive means may be used to
regulate births during the time-frame in which a wife's fertility deviates
from the natural rhythms of sterility and fertility.s For him, "Humanae
Vitae" really teaches that the nexus between procreation and unification of
the spouses is absolute only when procreation is naturally present.
Noonan's point of clarification of"H umanae Vitae" is troubling. How,
for example, is a conjugal act, which is de facto intrinsically closed to the
transmission of life, to be understood as open to the transmission of life?
Or, how is conjugal love as the nexus of procreation and unification to be
understood, when conjugal love can be licit when procreation is naturally
impossible? If satisfactory answers to those questions are not forthcoming
from the encyclical teaching, and I don't see that they are, then the rational
ground in the encyclical for the Magisterium's exceptionless opposition to
contraception becomes a significant issue.
A Resolution of the Issue
A fail-safe resolution to the issue would be simply to invoke the longstanding tradition, affirmed throughout the encyclical, of Church
opposition to contraception. Although that resolution might defuse the
issue for some people, it would be a less than ideal, if not a less than
desirable, resolution. The encyclical itself, in a point also consistent with
tradition, indicates that the persuasive argument for its teaching against
contraception can be understood and accepted by all people of good will.
In my view, a more effective resolution, which may be understood as
supplementary to the one from authority, is given in the following
argument:
Upright men can even better convince themselves of the solid grounds on which
the teaching of the Church in this field is based, if they care to reflect upon the
consequences of methods of artificial birth control. Let them consider, first of all,
how wide and easy a road would thus be opened up towards conjugal infidelity
and the general lowering of morality. Not much experience is needed in order to
know human weakness, and to understand that men - especially the young, who
are so vulnerable on this point - have need of encouragement to be faithful to the
moral law, so they must not be offered some easy means of eluding its
observance ....
Let it be considered that a dangerous weapon would thus be placed in the hands
of those public authorities who take no heed of moral exigencies. Who could
blame a government for applying to the solution of the problems of the
community those means acknowledged to be licit for married couples in the
solution of a family problem? Who will stop rulers from favoring, from even
imposing upon their peoples, if they were to consider it necessary, the method of
contraception which they consider to be the most efficacious?6

If this seldom recognized and virtually forgotten consequentialist
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argument in "Humanae Vitae" is updated and, thereby enhanced , it can, I
believe, offset Noonan's clarification and, more significantly, any
clarification which interprets the encyclical as being compatible with the
practice of contraception. To the point, an enhanced version of the
encyclical's consequentialist argument would make Noonan's type of
clarification irrelevant to the rightness of the magisterial stance against
contraception. For example, even ifthe basic encyclical action-guide, that
"each and every marital act must be open to the transmission of life",
cannot be taken literally, as Noonan argues, the proscription it implies
- contraceptives may not be used to regulate births - would continue to
be justified by an enhanced version of the encyclical's consequentialist
argument.
Updating the encyclical's consequentialist argument is not a difficult
task. Its projected scenario has become a reality and the result is worse
than the projection. Abortion is now widespread, teenage pregnancy
continues to increase and the institution of marriage has further broken
down . The clear sign of the times regarding human sexual values is
manifest in current American movies, virtually everyone of which
advocates "free love", either in the form offornication or adultery or both.
It is not so much that contraception has caused these consequences to
exist. Rather, contraception services an idolatrous network which denies
value to marriage, family, intimacy and even human life itself. "Humanae
Vitae" may not judge the motives of those who function in that network,
but it recognizes that their choices are based upon a very narrow and
ahistorical perspective of reality which has the ego-self posited in the
centei. 7 Through its consequentialist argument against contraception (and
also abortion), "Humanae Vitae" proposes a reasoned way for saying no to
a current quasi-nihilistic tide which honors no past nor recognizes a
long-term future. 8 The strength of that tide is rightly matched by the
firmness of the encyclical message against the practice of contraception.
The message is without exception and the encyclical's consequentialist
argument suggests a line of reasoning which would make that make sense.
The pertinent objection to the value of the consequentialist argument is
made by Noonan. 9 He dismisses the argument on the grounds that
"Humanae Vitae" itself already permits birth regulation through natural
means. He contends that the approval of contraception for married
couples in limited situations would influence sexual aberrations no more
than do natural methods of birth regulation. Noonan's reasoning here
presumes that a tight identity exists between contraceptive and natural
means of birth regulation, at least in regard to real or projected
consequences involving their use. Thus, what is true for the latter, in that
regard, should also be true for the former. Although this alignment may be
correct in a formal , i.e. , logical, sense, it is not practically accurate. In the
practical order, natural birth regulation is generally associated with the
family planning processes of Catholic married couples. As such, it is set
within the broader context of responsible parenthood. Natural family
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planning is simply one component of a whole piece which is positive
toward procreation.
When contraception is viewed from the perspective of the practical
order, however, it is seen as completely anti-procreative and it is not a
component of any broader context which changes that perspective. As
emphasized earlier, contraception goes hand in glove with sexual license
and sexual promiscuity, and with the AIDS problem now in our midst,
contraception is associated with sexual freedom more than ever before. On
that score, it is surely erroneous to think that the institutions of marriage
and the family, held in high esteem throughout the Church's long
tradition, would not be further and more seriously harmed were the
Church, one of the last holdouts against a contraceptive mentality, to
approve of the practice of contraception.
As a final point, perhaps it should be noted that the perspective from
which "H umanae Vitae's" consequentialist argument is made is natural law
morality, via the principle of totality. 10 The fact that the argument's
reasoning would also fit very easily into a rule utilitarian perspective is not
a liability in my judgment. On the contrary, it provides advocates of the
papal teaching with another access for promulgating "Humanae Vitae's"
anti-contraceptive and pro-life teaching.
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